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Malhotra: Author’s Response

Author’s Response: Cognitive Science, HistoryCentrism and the Future of Hindu Studies
Rajiv Malhotra
Infinity Foundation
I thank all three responders to my books for
their careful and detailed consideration of my
work. I will address the following concerns that

primarily on two points: the question of the
relationship of science to adhyatma vidya, or
the inner meditative practices taught by

they raise:
• their challenge to my claim that the
dharmic traditions are more in tune with
modern cognitive science than the
Abrahamic ones are
• their challenge to my claim that historycentrism in the Abrahamic faiths is an
important point of difference

dharmic traditions, and the issue of the
coherence and integral unity of Hinduism.
Rambachan regards the association of
Hinduism with science as spurious and
misleading, a product of the distorting
influence of the West on such Hindu figures as
Vivekananda and Aurobindo. He also regards
any claim to a Hindu unity as largely a

their claim that I ignore how historical
forces influence dharma
their claim against a coherent Hindu
philosophy and unity
Brian Pennington’s tension with the reality
that the academy seeks to engage me.

construct of colonialism. In both cases, he
thinks my views discount the role of the
exegetical tradition of Vedanta as insisted upon
by Shankara vis-à-vis direct inner experience.
In fact, I have asserted that the modern Hindu
thinkers have revitalized and expanded their
tradition in a way that is entirely in line with

I. Response to Ram bachan
Anantanand Rambachan has given the
most thorough and substantive response to my
work, and I thank him for it. We disagree

the past, that dharma has never been in tension
with science, and that in fact dharma and
today’s cognitive science come close to
converging. I also hold that Hindu dharma has

•
•
•
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a valuable and coherent past, present and
future with highly developed adhyatmic
practices and experiences.
I agree with Rambachan’s desire to protect

contemporary scientific thought accords with a
wide range of dharmic views and practices; he
fails to see that this area of thought itself draws
directly and extensively on Indian sources. A

Advaita Vedanta’s non-dualism and I share his
position on the utter unknowability of the
divine by means of ordinary consciousness,
owing to the subject/object split. I also share
his interest in preserving the diversity of the
Hindu dharma vis-à-vis those who would
reduce it to homogeneity. However, I part

large part of my work has to do with tracking
and repositioning certain Indian sources that
are at the heart of the confluence of science
and spirituality, which is the cutting edge of
Western thought. By contrast, Rambachan
refutes the validity of these ideas in Hindu
dharma. So the West appropriates what

company when he argues for reliance solely on
third-person textual authority for knowing
Brahman. As I shall explain, he is working from
some wrong assumptions about the nature of
science, the Vedanta-yoga relationship, and the
internal coherence and innate pluralism of the
dharma traditions.
It should be noted that Rambachan and I

Rambachan considers inauthentic. This
disconnect gets my attention.
Furthermore, his assertion that Hinduism
lacks coherence is mistaken, as well as
debilitating insofar as it deprives Hinduism of
its potential for providing an open architecture
of faiths that could serve as the basis for a truly
pluralist
framework
for
humanity.

come from different intellectual backgrounds
and therefore adopt different approaches to
the matter at hand. I speak from a background
in science as well as personal sadhana in
several dharmic approaches, based on which I
have extensively researched the Western
appropriation of Indian thought in psychology,

Rambachan’s sweeping rejection of modern
Hinduism (which he pejoratively calls “neoHinduism”) cuts this project off at the knees.
His emphasis on the primacy of the exegetical
tradition of Advaita Vedanta, while in many
ways a valuable corrective to the “anything
goes” kind of Hindu thinking that tends to

cognitive sciences, cosmology, philosophy and
religion. Rambachan takes what I believe to be
a more bookish and narrow approach that is
exclusively focused on Advaita Vedanta and
steeped in hermeneutical and exegetical
problems that arise from the use of the JudeoChristian paradigm for religious studies. My

prevail, is both extreme and limiting.
Rambachan
could
make
a
great
contribution to Hindu Studies if he could only
recognize the new paradigms emerging in
science and religion and accept a broader
definition of what Hinduism is and how it
relates to contemporary Western thought.

most important conversations and debates
have been in the philosophy of science and the
history of the transmission of ideas from India
to the West. His have been largely in academic
religious studies.
The result is an ironic “disconnect.” Not
only is Rambachan unaware of how closely

Were he to open his eyes to the Western
appropriation of Hindu ideas, he might (given
his expertise) be able to shed some muchneeded light on the matter in terms of
clarification and correction.
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‘New’ paradigms imported from India into
the West
My book Being Different claims that the
inner sciences of the dharmic traditions are

Buddhist sources, it became generalized into a
broader discourse on “science and religion,”
one which permeates the academy today
(except ironically in the study of Indian

closer to the spirit and substance of
contemporary scientific inquiry than are the
beliefs and practices of the Abrahamic
religions. Rambachan’s resistance to this claim
is the basis of much of his critique of my work
(and of modern Hinduism in general). In my
view, his phobic response to the association of

religions).
In simple terms, this scientific paradigm
developed from the recognition of the role of
the observer in cognition. Newtonian physics
assumed an objective reality independent of
consciousness. This is now considered
reductionist. The recent scientific shift is

science and religion is based on an outdated
paradigm of science. What’s more, it reflects a
narrow reading of the dharmic traditions. He
underestimates, for example, the significance
of direct inner inquiry and first-person
experience in Shankara’s teachings and in
Hinduism and Buddhism in general.
Rambachan insists on denying the

toward a metaphysics that is closer to the
cosmology of the Upanishads than to Christian
theological constructs (based, as they usually
are, on classical Greek models). This new
insight involves cultivating the ability to
experience reality in radically new ways. The
new scientists of cognition know Hinduism to
be closely related to their field, and adhyatma

connection between dharmic meditative
practices and the methods and metaphysical
assumptions of cognitive science as they are
practiced today. He ignores both the empirical
nature of the rishis’ experience and the new
scientific paradigms that are emerging. I wish
to stress that Hindus have had no cause to be

vidya is positioned as an important means of
scientific inquiry. Rambachan’s refusal to
engage with my work is therefore indicative of
a broader dis-connect between academic
Hinduism studies and the emerging cognitive
science.
Rambachan would probably agree with me

afraid of science in the way the Abrahamic
traditions have had cause, and that is because
the metaphysical and theological assumptions
of dharma are not dependent on the defense of
dogmatic historical revelations. Furthermore,
contemporary physics and cognitive science
challenge precisely the dualistic model of

that this interrelation between science and
dharma should not be studied (as it often has
been) by shearing off the cultural, religious and
philosophical context in which it was born.
This attempt to “sanitize” what is trivialized as
“eastern wisdom” and repackage it in western
secular scientific terms has been going on for

subject/object split – and they challenge it in
terms actually appropriated from the study of
Hinduism and Buddhism. It is first-person
experience and experiment that bind dharma
and cognitive science together. Once this new
paradigm of cognitive science became
crystallized with the help of Hindu and

too long. A large part of my current work is
aimed at documenting and understanding this
process of “digestion” and deracination.
The pattern is a recurring one: an
intellectual entrepreneur “goes east” in much
the same way that American frontiersmen
“went west.” He may feel that the Abrahamic

Published by Digital Commons @ Butler University, 2013

3

Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies, Vol. 26 [2013], Art. 6

Author’s Response: Cognitive Science, History-Centrism and the Future of Hindu Studies 31
religions are too restrictive or oppressive,
and/or that they are intellectually bankrupt in
the face of new evidence in physics, psychology
and healing sciences. New treasures are

have, in effect, redrawn the boundaries of what
is considered science today.
The box on the top left lists some of the
main dharmic sources that have been mined,

unearthed during this process of eastern
exploration, and these are especially prized
when they can be made to operate outside of
accepted western categories, including the
category of religion itself. At first, the Indian
aspects of these new bodies of knowledge are
noted and relished as the basis on which the

and that continue to be mined in this
enterprise. These Indian source traditions
include: Buddhism (especially Zen and IndoTibetan), Kashmir Shaivism, Patanjali’s yoga,
Tantra, Vedanta (especially Advaita and
Vishitadvaita), Vipassana, and the work of Sri
Aurobindo. This is far from an exhaustive list,

entrepreneur/frontiersman
can
establish
himself as an expert before his western peers.
But as that knowledge gets repackaged for
consumption in the West, the original contexts
are removed and left behind as “exotica.”
The repackaged knowledge and new
disciplines supersede the old Western religious
paradigms. Removing the original Indian

and one could easily add other influences such
as J. Krishnamurti, Ramana Maharshi,
Vivekananda and Paramahansa Yogananda, to
name just a few.
The box at the top right lists a few of the
many Western organizations involved in this
large-scale project. The Western disciplines
digesting
this
knowledge
encompass

contexts leads to forms of perennial philosophy
or secular scientism which are supposedly
value-free and operate outside of religious
myths and devotional practices. In my view,
this is a mistake, and if Rambachan believes
Vedanta is in need of being protected from this
deracination and de-contextualization, then I

philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, religion,
medicine, and so on. I have been studying
several of these groups for a forthcoming series
of books which will explore how Western
organizations go about identifying, selecting,
validating and repackaging the dharmic
knowledge, and then claim the status of

entirely agree with him. But it would also be a
great mistake to throw the baby out with the
bathwater, i.e., to deny all relationships
between dharmic traditions and the new
science.
The chart below shows the “digestion”
process by which dharma gets assimilated into

“original discoverers” by gradually erasing the
source traditions. (In Being Different, I explain
how lack of acknowledgment in this
appropriation differs from the appropriations
that were made from Hellenistic sources, and
why Western scholars do not treat Indian and
Hellenistic sources on par.)

modern cognitive science. It shows the Indian
sources of the new scientific paradigm and lists
some of the channels by which those sources
have entered Western consciousness, as well as
some ways in which they have constituted and
shaped new areas of study (even new
departments in the academy). These sources

The Western players cited in the top right
box have criticized the old-school approach
taken by Western religions, science, psychology
and philosophy. They find these disciplines to
be reductionist and in need of radical reform.
They often criticize Western thought by
turning directly and primarily to Indian

https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol26/iss1/6
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sources, and they do so to a degree that is not
sufficiently recognized. The two lower boxes
indicate that this “churning” process in the
West is crystalizing into well-defined and well-

•

established as pioneers and original
thinkers for Western audiences.
Once the Indian sources have been used to
gather knowledge and create credibility for

respected fields that are rapidly becoming
accepted into the mainstream academy. This
appropriation from India and tension or
conflict in the West between old and new
models started a century ago, but the
challenges to older paradigms have recently
intensified, prompting a dramatic rethinking in

themselves, the intermediaries dilute the
significance of those sources (this often
involves
elaborate
cover-ups)
and
sometimes even attack the dharmic sources
as being inferior.
The framework for this “digestion,” as I call
it, is partly secular science and partly Judeo-

mainstream circles. The very notions of science
and religion are changing.
Indian gurus both in India and in the West
trained individual American “frontiersmen,”
who then turned the knowledge gained at the
feet of those teachers into what was at first a
fringe movement. Over the past two
generations, these proto-movements have

Christianity. While many appropriations have
entered directly into Christianity (such as
Christian Centering Prayer from T.M., Christian
Yoga from Hindu Yoga, to name only two),
others have arrived via a longer route. This
latter category includes holistic healing,
neurosciences, and cognitive sciences.
As I have said, much of my disagreement

solidified and advanced from the fringe to the
mainstream of Western research, all the while
losing sight of, or repressing, their Indian roots.
The list of mainstream institutions and major
intellectual figures participating in this process
is indeed impressive. There has often been a
double role played by the various

with Rambachan centers around (1) his lack of
awareness of what science is today and (2) the
absorption of Indian thought into this new
science. My approach is different. When I use
the term “adhyatma vidya,” for instance, I’m
relating it to the modes of empirical inquiry as
currently understood in cognitive science. This

intermediaries, individuals as well as
institutions.
• These intermediaries appropriate from
dharma what is (or until recently was)
novel in the West, and often express harsh
criticism of the prevailing Western
religious models. This helps them get

method involves first-person experience
combined with third-person analysis of mind.
Rambachan works from a different model of
what science is and he finds it to be antithetical
to Advaita Vedanta. We also differ on the
importance of text and transmission in
dharmic traditions vis-à-vis the West, an issue
to which I will return.

Published by Digital Commons @ Butler University, 2013
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Main sources of appropriation:
• Vedanta
• Zen Buddhism
• Indo-Tibetan Buddhism
• Kashmir Shaivism
• Patanjali Yoga
• Transcendental Meditation
• Tantra, Kundalini, Chakras
• Vipassana
• Sri Aurobindo

Some leading individual &
institutional appropriators
• Ken Wilber’s Integral Institute
• John Templeton Foundation
• Mind & Life Institute
• Consciousness Studies Programs
• Mindfulness Meditation
• Center for Compassion & Altruism
Research & Education
• Neuro-phenomenology

Re-contextualization of Appropriations:
•
•
•
•

Emerging New School of Religious Studies
Cognitive Science and Religion
Integral Theory of Wilber
Rejecting Western hermeneutics, philosophy,
psychology

Scientific	
  
Validation	
  as	
  
new	
  ‘Discovery’	
  

Re-‐training	
  
Jewish	
  &	
  
Christian	
  Clergy	
  

Attacking	
  Old	
  
Disciplines	
  

Figure 1

New Science of Consciousness without
dualism/objectification
Rambachan cites Shankara as the great
counter-example to my emphasis on adhyatma
vidya. He makes the valid point that Shankara

https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol26/iss1/6
DOI: 10.7825/2164-6279.1545
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objects, i.e., it objectifies whatever object is
being studied as something that exists
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independently of the subject. It is true that this
dualistic method cannot lead one to knowledge
of Brahman, but Rambachan shows an
awareness only of old-school science when he

has mushroomed and now spans many fields,
including the philosophy of science,
psychology, arts, neuroscience, religion,
healing, etc. I shall not attempt here to present

makes this point.
Quantum mechanics has radically changed
science in this regard. According to QM (as per
many interpretations), consciousness plays a
role as the observer in “creating” (by collapsing
into) the state of the object that is observed. In
other words, there is no particular state that

a tutorial on this vast terrain. Suffice it to say
that the term “first-person empiricism” is now
widely accepted as the means to knowing
consciousness directly by experiencing nondual states. Although initially marginalized
upon its arrival in the West, this new paradigm
has become respectable and is seriously

the object is in until it is observed. Prior to an
object’s being observed, what we have are
probabilities for its existence in various
possible states. In a sense, the very act of
observation “creates” the state of the object in
which it is found.
The link between this new physics and
dharma has been noted since the discovery of

challenging old reductionist views of science.
What is most relevant to our discussion is
that the pioneers in this science of
consciousness start off by attacking the
classical Western (Newtonian and Cartesian)
models as being reductionist, and precisely for
the reasons cited by Rambachan: the models
are dualistic in their separation of subject and

QM by Heisenberg and Schrodinger (both Nobel
Laureates in physics). Each of these pioneers
cited the Upanishads as the only source of
philosophy known to them that was consistent
with the paradoxical nature of reality
according to QM.1 Western philosophical
frameworks at that time (the 1920s and early

object, and assume wrongly that objects have a
separate self-existence. Rambachan, then,
cannot very well accuse the new science of
consciousness of the very problem it seeks to
resolve, i.e., the reductionism intrinsic in
“objectification” as practiced in scientific
enquiry.

'30s) failed to accommodate any such
possibility as QM. This ushered in a new era of
speculative research into the nature of
consciousness and its relationship with the
physical cosmos.
Most
of
the
early
philosophical
explanations of QM explicitly invoked ideas

Are we all potential rishis?
I call adhyatma vidya “inner science” for a
reason, which is to emphasize that after the
rishis meditated and articulated in the
Upanishads what they “saw,” these first-person
experiences were systematized and debated in

from Vedanta. There was a frenzied attempt to
replace the separate Western frameworks for
consciousness and matter with a unified
framework based on Vedanta. (In most dharma,
metaphysical systems, consciousness, and
matter were never separate frameworks.) The
research literature on such ideas in the West

peer reviews in India. This tradition of purva
paksha and uttara paksha is how major Indian
systems were established, i.e., through a
combination
of
empirical
observation,
argumentation, and peer review which strongly
resembles the scientific method. This process
has never been in tension with the scientific

Published by Digital Commons @ Butler University, 2013
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method because it is not bound to absolutist
claims of history that are non-reproducible and
hence non-verifiable. It is this conjunction that
Vivekananda and other modern Hinduism

inherently incapable of “seeing” as the rishis
did, then he would be setting himself up for a
massive contradiction, with core tenets of the
atman being the same in everyone, rishi or not.

intuited and that is being developed today.
Rambachan has not addressed the key
question: How did the rishis “see” the shruti in the
first place? Unlike the Abrahamic religions, in
which prophets hear from an external God, in
the Vedas there is no external voice. There is
no entity equivalent to Yahweh who speaks the

I am unaware of any way out of this
problem other than my concluding that each
human also has the same potential as the rishis,
and that this potential is realized through
disciplined sadhana (the inner sciences of
adhyatma vidya), even though very few of us
are able to realize the ultimate result in one

Vedas to the rishis. Nobody says anything like:
“I am Brahma, the Creator, and I am giving you
these covenants . . .” So Rambachan must
explain how the Vedas were “seen” by the
rishis.
He cannot respond by saying that the
Vedas were original compositions by the rishis,
because Vedas are a-purusheya, i.e.,

human lifetime; most of us will need to be
reborn many times in order to evolve to the
rishi state.
Summarizing my position on meditation
• Since the Vedas were “seen” by the rishis,
and we humans have this same capacity,
each of us has the potential to achieve the

beginningless and authorless. They existed
before the rishis “saw” them. So if the rishis
neither composed them nor heard them spoken
by an external person or entity, how is it that
they were able to “see” them? To the best of my
knowledge, Rambachan, in his four decades of
re-stating his position on the dichotomy

•

same experience on his own. In other
words, we, too, can know Brahman. This
knowledge is not achieved by means of
dualistic cognition but by non-dual
cognition, which Western science is only
beginning to examine.
This study of non-dual cognition is

•

“scientific” in that it relies on first-person
empiricism which may be replicated, and
because the results of that experience are
examined and correlated by a community
of interpreters who are free from historycentric constraints.
This brings us head-on to Rambachan’s

between Vedanta and direct experience, has
never dealt with this key question. What I am
doing here, in effect, is sending the problem
back to him and asking him for a solution in his
own framework.
It is important to note that Hinduism does
not regard the rishis as inherently different in
substance or essence from the rest of us.
Therefore, if the rishis had the capability of
“seeing” the shruti without any external God
speaking to them, and without any previous
textual tradition or “revelation” to draw on,
why can’t we do so as well? If Rambachan were
to respond to this question by saying we are

https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol26/iss1/6
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moksha. Unfortunately Shankara does not
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explain his method in much detail, though
his own practice and development of the
system do indicate he was not dismissive of
direct experience. (Some scholars have

Locating Integral Unity in the New
Discourse
Rambachan has devoted his distinguished
career to the study of Advaita Vedanta and so it

argued that his emphasis was on refuting
the opponents of his time and that this did
not require that he explain his method of
meditation.)
In my book, I do not recommend any
specific method of meditation. I merely
assert that various methods are available to

is natural that he would want this philosophy
to be the central point of any discussion he
enters. But my notion of integral unity cannot
be collapsed into and limited to Advaita
Vedanta per se, and I certainly do not consider
ultimate reality to be a homogeneous,
otherworldly realm, as is sometimes claimed.

every human. My only purpose is to
contrast the meditative approach with the
Abrahamic notion of history-centrism and
in so doing, demonstrate that we can
achieve what the rishis achieved. The Jew
or Christian or Muslim cannot participate
in prophecy (i.e., directly receive and then
declare the word of God), whereas in

My interest in integrality originated as part of
my study of the science of consciousness
mentioned above.
Again, fundamentally, our greatest
disagreement has to do with the different ways
we locate our analyses. I am primarily
interested in the Western appropriation of
Eastern ideas, not in defending a “pure” version

dharma all humans are capable of selfenlightenment without having to depend
on any such historical event.
I refer to the methods of achieving higher
states of consciousness as a “science,” but
not in the limited sense that the term has
been used in the past. Science has taken on

of Hinduism. My project is located in the
history of ideas, with emphasis on the
transmission of ideas from India to the West.
For example, I have tracked Ken Wilber’s
appropriation of Sri Aurobindo’s theory of
integral unity, as well as Kashmir Shaivism,
Tantra and Madhyamika Buddhism. I want to

a new meaning; it no longer denotes
dualistic reductionism, something that
bothers Rambachan as much as it bothers
me.
None of Rambachan’s arguments has any
bearing on my book’s central point, which is
that dharmic systems are not history-centric

discuss Wilber in some depth, not only because
his work and influence are much greater than
most scholars of religion realize but because he
exemplifies much in the contemporary
Western digestion of Eastern thought.
Wilber’s early books explicitly translated
Indian ideas for the benefit of Western

whereas Abrahamic religions are. He simply
dodges the issue of history-centrism and thus
misunderstands many of my related points.

researchers, especially psychologists and
philosophers. Initially he attacked Judaism and
Christianity for the same kinds of problems I
have cited in my book: dependence on
historical and exclusive revelation, dualism,
and so on. In effect, he used Indian ideas to
attack Western religion and psychology and

•

•
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thus became established as a Western pioneer
in what were considered “new” discoveries.
But gradually his ambition grew. Not only
did he appropriate Indian ideas using his own

foremost given that the theory is based on
principles that exist in Hinduism.
Wilber’s reformulated dharmic ideas appeal
to those Westerners who want to “come home,”

terminology; he also claimed to have surpassed
them. He said he found serious flaws in the
Indian sources and that these discoveries made
him reject Hinduism and promote his own
formulations. His chief criticism addresses only
Advaita Vedanta, which he uses to dismiss all of
Hinduism.
He
cites
only
secondary

as it were, from their journeys into Hinduism
or Buddhism, and this appeal accounts for his
success in raising funds. In the process, he has
rekindled Western chauvinism, using so-called
universal terms in a totalizing, Hegelian
fashion.
Despite Wilber’s prominence and influence,

interpretations of Advaita Vedanta, which he
uses to claim that it is otherworldly escapism
and hence incapable of achieving progress or
promoting social ethics in this world. In this, he
parrots the old interpretations of Christian
missionaries. (These are the same views that
were unfortunately adopted by Ram Mohan
Roy and other Indians in the modern period as

no scholar of Indian religions has bothered to
respond to what he is saying. Whenever I raise
concerns about his misappropriations and
misinterpretations among scholars of Hinduism
and Buddhism, they show no interest and even
dismiss his ideas as irrelevant and nonsensical.
But he is relevant, and his repackaging of
dharmic thought has profound implications for

a sort of standard critique of Hinduism.)
Wilbur’s appropriations and redefinitions
are disingenuous given that most of his sources
(again, Sri Aurobindo, Kashmir Shaivism,
Tantra and Madhyamika Buddhism) do not at
all espouse a homogeneous and otherworldly
reality, as he is well aware. He cleverly borrows

how Hinduism is received and understood.
An important objective of Being Different is
to re-establish the dharmic foundations of what
has become a large “Integral Studies”
movement led by Wilber, and this requires that
we redress the misinterpretation of sources
(and concomitant reductionism) in his

from many Indian sources, which we will call
“X”, and uses this to criticize one specific
Indian school (Advaita Vedanta). He uses this
criticism as the basis for rejecting all Hinduism.
Even if his arguments about Advaita Vedanta
were valid, his rejection of that school could
not apply to all of Hinduism.

formulation. I wish to remind Wilber’s camp of
his own earlier assertions that Western
religions are in conflict with the new ideas he
has “discovered” – assertions that suggest that
these religions need to be revised or reinvented
in light of integral theories. What we have,
then, is a massive importation of Indian ideas

Wilber and his followers formulated a
theory that contains no references to dharma
sources; instead it refers to what are called
“Integral Christianity” and “Integral Judaism.”
Ironically there is no Integral Hinduism in his
schema, despite my having suggested to his
acolytes that this ought to have been first and

that are used in the transformation of Judaism
and Christianity but no acknowledgment of the
original sources of those ideas.
My own view of the integral unity of
dharmic traditions is based on their shared
methodology in terms of adhyatma vidya. This
position enables me to defend these traditions
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against piecemeal appropriations such as
Wilbur’s and point out the shortfalls of those
appropriations. Ironically Rambachan opposes
my view of the integral unity of dharma, partly,

worlds, or of the distinct “parts” of reality we
perceive as differentiated, and the putative
“whole,” which is not. The diagram in Figure 2
summarizes this idea. The left and right

I think, because he is unaware of the way in
which the term “dharma” is already in play
both among intellectuals and in popular
discourse as well. Rambachan inadvertently
provides a great service to Wilber’s movement
by denying that Hinduism has the metaphysics
of integral unity. While Wilber appropriates his

extremes show the two common views most
people have concerning the nature of a “part”
of the whole reality.2 A part of the totality can
be a physical object, an idea, an emotion, etc. –
anything we can perceive as an entity. The
question then arises: What is the status of such
an entity in relation to the whole? The stated

key ideas from Hinduism, Rambachan argues
that such ideas are not part of Hinduism and
seems unaware of the broad discourse at work.
It is a triumph for Wilber to have co-opted such
a major figure in Hinduism studies.
Reclaiming Integral Unity as a principle of
dharma

assertion on the left portion of the diagram is
that the entity exists by itself, i.e., that it has
self-existence. This seems intuitively obvious to
the ordinary mind. After all, the tree, the table,
keyboard, I, and everything I experience seem
to exist. This view is dualistic. It stems from the
ordinary ego state of objective cognition
whereas the dharmic approach has to do with

My concept of integral unity is not to be
conflated with a strict view of Advaita Vedanta
as the linchpin of that unity. In fact, Appendix
A of my book explains integral unity with
respect to several different dharmic traditions.
Hinduism’s integral unity is mainly illustrated
by Sri Jiva Goswami’s Achintya-Bhedabheda,

transcending that level of experience or
consciousness.
The assertion on the right side represents
the other extreme, which is that the entity does
not exist at all, i.e., its existence is an illusion.
As discussed above, this latter view has been
advanced as a common interpretation of

which is similar to Ramanuja’s Vishishtadvaita.
The appendix also explains integral unity from
the perspective of Buddhism and Jainism.
One disagreement I have with Rambachan
concerns the status of the relative and absolute

Advaita Vedanta, and it is one with which I
strongly disagree.
I espouse the view in the middle, which is
that the entity is mithya, a Sanskrit word with
no exact equivalent in English.

Object exists
independently

Object is
mithya

Object is
an illusion

Figure 2
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Unfortunately mithya has been seriously
mistranslated as “illusion.” As many
commentators and acharyas in the tradition
have stressed, this is incorrect. According to

are pre-conceptual and non-linguistic levels of
vibration, and hence cannot be replaced by
conventional language at all. But Sanskrit has a
unique claim in that its beej mantras, or the

this middle view, every entity exists relative to
something other than itself. Jiva Goswami’s
interpretation is that an entity exists only as a
mode or form of Bhagvan and does not exist
independently as itself. In other words, since
Bhagvan is real, his forms are also real, but they
do not have independent self-existence.

primordial sounds that comprise its building
blocks, operate at all four levels. At the lower
two levels, madhyam and vaikhari, the mantras
manifest as the Sanskrit primordial sounds
which we speak and hear. But these levels are
directly linked to the higher ones, para and
pasyanti. Sanskrit is non-translatable in two

(Analogy: A smile exists as a form or mode of
the face, and cannot exist independently of the
face.) I explain In Being Different how mithya as
relative existence fits in with Buddhism’s idea
of mutual co-existence, though this is different
from the relative existence in Hinduism
because there is nothing equivalent to
Brahman as an absolute. Integral unity,

respects: first, according to the dharmic view,
this link is not found in any other language.
There is thus a unique and irreducible nontranslatability here. Second, any language is a
web of contextual relations that cannot be
mapped onto a different network of contexts.
Different contexts carry different meanings.
Although this problem is not particular to

understood this way, is not homogeneous but
has parts that are mithya. Nor is integral unity
in one dharmic system the same as in another.
Rambachan accuses me of the view
depicted in the diagram’s right extreme,
namely, that I see reality as one homogeneous
whole. In doing so, he does an injustice to the

Sanskrit, translation problems here are
especially acute because the original social and
cultural context is largely lost.
The non-translatability principle does not
mean I do not want any Sanskrit word ever to
be translated or that the work of translators is
unimportant. It simply means that there should

concept of integral unity as I have articulated
it, and responds instead with his stock position
concerning Advaita Vedanta.

be a preference for bringing the important
terms of Sanskrit into other languages as intact
as possible (including sharp attention to
pronunciation and intonation, which are being
quickly eroded through the popularity of yoga
and Westernized kirtan today) and that when
translation is necessary, it should be done with

Mantra, language and non-translatability
A lesser but still important point
Rambachan raises has to do with my emphasis
on the non-translatability of Sanskrit,
especially in relation to mantra. I wish to
respond by drawing on a perspective from
Kashmir Shaivism. Kashmir Shaivism holds that
vac (speech) exists at four levels of subtlety.
From most subtle to most gross, these are: para,
pasyanti, madhyam and vaikhari. The first two
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II. Response to Pennington
Much of Pennington's critique has nothing
to do with my book, but is about me personally.
This special issue of the Journal of Hindu-

with some precision. History-centrism is not
the same as historical consciousness or interest
in historical truth, both of which are definitely
present in Indian thought. Rather, it is about a

Christian Studies was designed as a discussion
and critique of my book, Being Different, but a
good deal of what Pennington writes amounts
to personal attacks on me. In fact, Pennington
states explicitly that he is left wondering what
my motive/agenda is; he is troubled that the
academy treats me as a serious scholar worthy

certain reification of the historical record of
God’s interventions through prophets. These
(alleged) recorded occurrences are then used as
the basis for theological claims, political
projects, and religious practices.
The point of difference, again, concerns
shruti, not smriti: The direct experience of

of a seat at the table. I have decided not to
respond to him by going "tit for tat" on
personal matters or with insinuations.
History Centrism Ignored
Brian Pennington would seem not to
understand my main points in Being Different, in
particular my analysis of history-centrism as it

shruti is possible for all humans whereas in the
Abrahamic religions, prophecy is not available
to all humans, in part because the time and
place matter and sometimes even determine
the content of the revelation. Let me repeat: in
the dharmic view, shruti is independent of
history, but smriti is not. The Hindu texts are
careful to keep these separate and the

contrasts with the relative freedom from
history found in the dharmic traditions. He
charges that I am mounting “an uncritical
promotion of a homogenized Indic heritage
whose superior character… rests on the fact
that it is protected from the forces of history.”
Apparently he is unaware of the distinction

traditions have generally drawn a clear and
logical boundary between them. In the JudeoChristian religions, the two categories are
collapsed. Both the Hebrew Bible and the New
Testament have content for which shruti status
may be claimed as well as other content that
can only be explained as smriti. (In fact, the

between smirti and shruti, even though my
book goes to considerable pains to highlight
this distinction. Smirti is clearly historical; shruti
is not. Smriti, by definition, is a product of the
forces of history and is shaped by the
psychology, social position, and general
cultural context of humans involved in its

Bible is full of material that, from a dharmic
point of view, would be called purana or itihas.)
The primary task of Christian and Jewish
exegesis is to draw and redraw the line
between these two aspects. There are extreme
positions at both ends. Fundamentalists argue
that the whole of their Bible is revelation, what

development and transmission. Throughout his
argument, Pennington suggests I am somehow
“against” history and historical readings of past
texts. This would be tantamount to my being
against smriti, which is simply untrue.
Pennington entirely misreads my concept
of history-centrism, which I have explained

the dharmic view would label as shruti; liberal
revisionists and secularists argue that all or
most of it is historical tradition, i.e., what the
dharmic would classify as smirti. The whole
process in the west is, however, clouded and
sometimes even violent, once again because of
the problem of history centrism. The particular
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manifestation of God in specific and
unrepeatable events in time and through
specially honored persons or prophets implies
that the very content of these revelations is

Hindu dharma were the same as arguing for the
homogenization of India and thus for fascism.
This prejudiced reading of my work creates a
smoke screen for failure or refusal to engage

historical and the historical identity, authority
and destiny of the messengers affects, and to
some degree determines, the message (which
does not have the same weight if uttered by
anyone other than a prophet). Historycentrism also puts witnesses in conflict with
one another since there cannot be a plurality of

with my particular assertions about Hinduism.
So let me say once again that I fully support the
pluralistic construction of political and social
structures that will protect and advance the
rights of all peoples and especially minorities,
women and the poor.
There is a silent assumption that the only

views on the actuality of a historical event.
Hence the two categories of history and eternal
truth become cloudy at every turn. The
dharmic traditions do not have this problem,
not because they are a-historical but because
they distinguish clearly between the two
categories.
None of the three scholars really engages

way to avoid Hindu fundamentalism is to adopt
the position that there is no such thing as a
unified Hindu dharma. I have already spoken of
a version of this view which I think Rambachan
holds, albeit tacitly. Pennington has to confront
this view more directly as he faces high stakes
in this debate. He is best known for having
written the book Was Hinduism Invented?, which

with history centrism, which is a central
concept in my work. In part, this is because
they do not look at the Judeo-Christian
tradition through dharmic lenses. Their view of
Western religions is conditioned (no doubt
unconsciously) by their Western training and
assumptions. Westerners often find it troubling

argues that Hinduism was fabricated under
British influence and that this fabrication
accounts for its alleged lack of coherence, unity
and continuity, i.e., it is a sort of fraud.
I argue the contrary. Not only is there such
a thing as Hinduism; it has a long history and
has a vital role to play in the public sphere. The

to deal with their history centrism as seen from
a dharmic viewpoint.

alternative of a repressive secularism -- which
many scholars, either explicitly or implicitly,
would seem to support -- is a disaster in the
making. I wish to see the dharmic principles
adapted for a contemporary pluralistic society.
In my book I expressly advocate mutual respect
for other faiths; hence arguing in favor of the

Creating
a
Binary:
Hindu
Fundamentalism
or
non-existent
Hinduism
Pennington further implies that in
defending the “difference” intrinsic in dharma
I am in some way colluding with the rise of
Hindu fundamentalism and with its attempted
suppression of minorities. Unfortunately, today
it is virtually impossible to make any positive
assertions about Hinduism without incurring
this kind of slur. It is as if arguing for a distinct
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Pennington argues, in a related vein, that it
is my intention “to studiously avoid any
suggestion that dharmic traditions are
multiple, distinct in their various expressions,

“unity templates for moral action and the
apprehension of reality,” but I do so because
this is precisely how they have functioned in
the religious lives of many people. To study and

or products of disparate influences.” He quotes
me — quite accurately -- as saying that “if
dharma is put forward merely as an eclectic
collection of disparate ideas, it will lack the
cohesiveness necessary to function as a force
for change.” But these two statements, his and
mine, do not correspond in any way. Of course,

critique narratives in these terms is a wellestablished practice in the humanities, and to
suggest that my doing so is somehow
tantamount to a denial of historical context
and conditioning is a serious misreading.

dharmic traditions are multiple and distinct;
that is precisely the thing about them that I
wish to uphold. And of course they are the
product of various influences: historical, social,
intellectual, cultural and experiential. I have
often said as much. I do not, however, hold that
they lack internal coherence.

Pennington has long argued against
“Hinduism” as a legitimate term, and naturally
he wishes to safeguard and defend his previous
work. Hence, he attacks my treatment of
Hinduism as coherent and also a positive
resource. Yet he has not been able to pinpoint
any central or fundamental flaws in my
treatment, at least not in any compelling way.

Differences in ‘Chaos’ Narratives
Pennington goes on to question my
“categorical” assessment that Westerners are
especially uneasy about the notion of variation
and nuance in the domain of ethics, that they
see India and Indians as lacking in ethical
principles, and that for similar reasons they are

Perhaps it is for this reason that he turns
from the book he was supposed to review and
takes aim instead at my prior, unrelated work
of many years ago. In fact he states explicitly
that he accepted this invitation to write in
order to address his old gripes with what he
sees as my “career as a Hindu activist.” He

baffled and disturbed by Indian aesthetics. But
my position here is based squarely on a great
deal of evidence in a large number of
sociological and psychological studies, evidence
which I present and annotate copiously in Being
Different.
My book adds two analytic points to that

writes:
Why do Princeton and the University of
Massachusetts offer him a podium? Why does
the International Journal of Hindu Studies
organize a symposium on his work? Why does
the Society for Hindu-Christian Studies honor
him with serious discussion of his book at one of

body of evidence: (1) the Western response
originates in a fear of chaos, and (2) this fear
has deep roots in both Biblical and Hellenistic
cosmology. It is in this context that I offer a
comparative reading of narratives found in
Genesis, Homer and Indian sources. I do indeed,
as Pennington claims, treat these narratives as

the only two sessions it holds annually and with
a symposium in the one issue of its annual
journal?
Unable to refute, or even engage with, my
book’s arguments, he thus resorts to dismissing
my right to be at the table in current debates.
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Aastika: Coherence and change
Why does Pennington wish to exclude me
from the table? To answer this, we must
address the difficult question of what

gurus formulating innovative interpretations
that challenge established ones can be traced
back to classical times. Vivekananda, Gandhi,
Sri Aurobindo, Ramana Maharshi – these are

constitutes religious studies – and indeed
religion itself – in today’s world. Is religion
defined by one fixed and frozen canon to be
interpreted only by academic scholars and
“legitimate” exegetists? Or is it a living, organic
entity that evolves, with new discoveries and
contexts that encourage “churning” among its

but a few of the modern gurus who have
reformulated Hindu dharma for their own
contexts. But again, the trend is much older.
There is nothing new or “manufactured” about
this dynamism, in spite of what Pennington
would have us believe.
So coherence and unity exist but in a

practitioners, often resulting in new forms of
consensus that challenge and replace old ones?
I claim it is the latter. Hinduism is arguably the
most dynamic of the major religions, with a
long history of diverse schools and a seemingly
inexhaustible supply of new gurus who debate
amongst themselves without a central nexus of
authority to adjudicate over them. Put another

dynamic equilibrium that is conducive to
rigorous, constructive debate. This aspect of
Hinduism poses a serious problem for Western
academics, whose methods were developed for
the less fluid and more reified “religions of the
book.” It is time for the academy to re-imagine
Hindu dharma on new terms, and this requires
engaging those thinkers whose voices the

way, these gurus are like intellectual
entrepreneurs who compete with each other by
advancing new ideas, revising old ones, etc. I
have argued that Hinduism’s freedom from
absolutist history centrism accounts for this
dynamism, which I think should be encouraged
at the academic level as well.

Hindu communities recognize as their own.
Pennington’s problem in locating m e in
his stereotypes
With respect to my work in particular, it
troubles Pennington that he cannot locate me
in his limited, narrow framework of where

The term “aastika” is useful in gaining an
understanding of this churning practice in
Hinduism’s long history and in appreciating the
unity in dharma. “Aasitka” encapsulates how
Hindus have vigorously debated the criteria for
what constitutes their faith. The very existence
of such a term at the center of Hindu discourse

Hindus belong. There are two main ways in
which Hindus have participated in the Western
academy.
One way is as an outsider, or “native
informant,” who has less power in relation to
the scholar and who seldom talks back or
shares in the prestige and recognition of

shows that the quest for coherence is very old.
At the same time, the definition of aastika has
long been vigorously contested and debated. In
stark contrast to the Nicene Creed of
Christianity3, there is no static, history-centric
statement or institutionalized criterion for
aastika. The phenomenon of multiple Hindu

authorship. He certainly does not get a chance
to articulate what he sees when he “reverses
the gaze,” i.e., ceases to be the object and fixes
his own gaze on the Westerner. It is mostly
poor villagers who have been “studied” as
native informants, though many gurus have
been as well, and often with their full co-
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operation. These gurus are largely ignorant of
the “playing field” and in many cases are
dependent on Western patronage.
The second way a Hindu participates in

argument would have gained no hearing
whatsoever.
In the case of Being Different, however,
Pennington is simply wrong in stating that I

Western studies is as a scholar inside the
academy, where he is under great pressure to
adopt the syndicated and authorized
hermeneutics of his mentors and peers, and
often compromises his own tradition’s
siddhanta (theory and method) in doing so.
Many such individuals have told me they, in

wrote it as a way of “speaking back to the
academy.” He also alleges that I wrote the book
as a way of engaging directly with the scholarly
world. Indeed, a decade back I did focus on
changing the Western system through its own
guardians, but for many years now, most of my
target audience has been from the Hindu

effect, lead double lives: privately they can
agree with me and even help me in my own
pursuit of reform, but in front of peers, they
must protect their careers by closing ranks.
Some Hindu scholars have gone even further
and marketed themselves as “sepoys,” to be
used as “hit men” against uncontrollable
Hindus like me who refuse to submit.

dharma community in the broad sense. In the
process, I have actively engaged the leading
gurus, civic and industry leaders, as well as
scholars, both in India and North America. As
the record shows, my book has reading lists in
Indian university departments of psychology,
management, social sciences, technology, etc.
Also, my critique of the inauthentic

Pennington’s problem is that I fit into
neither category. I am not a benign, passive
native informant available to help scholars by
supplying them with the data that they want to
hear. Nor do I tailor my scholarship to fit
current academic norms in the study of
Hinduism.

appropriation of Indian ideas and practices has
placed certain Western schools of thought
under scrutiny. This broad reception is based
on the realization that what I am proposing is
“a new gaze,” both internally, at Hinduism
itself, and externally, at the West -- a gaze
moreover which empowers Hindus to see

Pennington also takes umbrage at my
pointed attacks on the self-validating and
closed circle of peer review in the academy and
on the prevalence of heavy funding for the
study of hypotheses that “just happen” to
support or benefit projects of Western
hegemony, both intellectual and political. I

themselves as global citizens with dharmabased identities. Thanks to the power of the
internet and social media in general, my book is
having a global impact. It is also now reaching
American classrooms, where people like
Pennington teach.
As a result not just of my work in this area

would simply like to point out that while
corruptions of the peer review system in the
academy become scandals in the sciences, they
go largely unnoticed in the humanities, and
had I taken a more deferential and subaltern
tone in drawing attention to them, my

but also of a much broader movement of ideas,
the Western academy no longer enjoys a
monopoly
on
shaping
the
public’s
understanding of “the East.” Americans today
receive their ideas about Indian traditions
through travel, the workplace, Indian friends,
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novels, art, popular culture, the Internet, and
other emerging channels.
This increasingly well-informed readership
regards many of the old-school portrayals of

legal disputes over the teaching of evolution in
American schools today. Second, I am well
aware of the blurring of the line between
science and religion today, though I do not

Hinduism as bizarre, inaccurate and unreliable.
My own work provides a much-needed analytic
platform for their concerns, as even those
within the academy are starting to realize.
When I do address the academy (and I do so
only by invitation), I try to hold its leading
scholars accountable for the misinformation

think it takes quite the simplistic form Edelman
suggests. I have explained my views on this in
detail in my response, above, to Rambachan. A
third point: the Templeton Foundation’s
program on science and religion was largely
built by scholars who borrowed Hindu and
Buddhist ideas; most of its initial thinkers

and confusion they spread, and to expose how
these errors arise from self-perpetuating
structures and entrenched positions. If this in
itself makes me appear as a threat, I feel
satisfied that my work is making a difference. I
am glad there are a growing number of serious
and open-minded academicians who wish to
engage with the substance of my arguments

drank heavily from those wells. Figure 1 lists
Templeton as one of the major organizations
built on digesting dharmic knowledge and
transforming it into new frameworks that
appear to be original.
With respect to the question of historycentrism, Edelman notes that certain Hindu
traditions give central theological authority to

while taking the wider context into account.
III. Response to Edelman
Like Rambachan and Pennington, Jonathan
Edelman expresses concern about my
treatment of science and history-centrism, and
takes me to task for not understanding the

a particular purana and make its author central
as well. But here again, he misses the point. It is
not that Indian thought does not take note of
the particular circumstances of certain texts or
value their association with certain authors. Of
course these texts and authors arrive in time;
how else could they occur? Of course the

diversity of both Hinduism and Christianity. He
asserts that I oversimplify the tension between
religion and science in the West, and cites the
(very infrequent) acceptance of scientific views
by Christians and the new blurring of the
boundaries between science and religion as
exemplified
by
the
John
Templeton

teachings about Brahman have a history and a
context and even, at points, an internal
unfolding order. But these teachings do not
depend on specific historical events and
validations equivalent to the exodus of the
Israelites from Egypt under Moses or the
resurrection of Jesus. In Judaism and in

Foundation.
First, it is a matter of historical record that
Christianity and science in the West have long
been violently opposed. Galileo was censured
by the church and Darwin’s theories were
strongly resisted in most mainstream Christian
circles. This resistance lives on in political and

Christianity, respectively, they do. The
distinctions between shruti and smriti help to
illuminate this point.
The important question here is: Would the
theology of bhakti be significantly different if it
were “proved” that the Bhagavata Purana came
to someone other than Vyasa, or at some other
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time or place? The answer is: not at all. But if it
were proved that the Ten Commandments were
delivered outside of the Jewish tradition and
Jewish history, or if they were, say, delivered

not at all operate like a parampara or line of
transmission in dharma, even though Edelman
claims it does. Among other things, these
prophets are in competition with one another

out of sequence with regard to other key
revelations in Judaism, then that religion would
be profoundly affected. Jews could no longer
see themselves as unique bearers of truth in
history
with
unique
privileges
and
responsibilities. Likewise, if the revelation that
God is the savior came to someone other than

for complete and exclusive control over their
respective traditions, and that control depends,
as I have said, on their place in an unfolding
linear temporality and on the events and
outcomes of history itself.
Edelman also criticizes what he takes to be
my lack of awareness of the diversity within

Jesus, Christians could no longer believe either
in the incarnation or the trinity, the two
essential doctrinal pillars of their faith. For
Vaishavites,
however,
the
bhakti
reinterpretation of the whole of the Vedic past
is true, and would be true even if someone else
in some other time and place had discovered it.
Its validity does not depend on historical

Christianity. In my view (that is, the dharmic
view), this notion of Christian diversity is
myopic at best. Clearly people like Edelman feel
the need to rescue the West from its history of
violent suppression of diverse religious views,
and so they repeatedly hold up the example of
a few dissenters. (These are mostly American
Protestants of the past two centuries who no

events contemporary with the discovery or on
the particular ethnic and historical identity of
Vyasa himself. Vaishnavites do not claim that
this history created a new, unique covenant or
new ritam that was previously unavailable and
that is available today only through the
knowledge of that covenant and no other way.

longer represent the Christian mainstream, if
in fact they ever did.) Edelman cites, for
instance, Christians who do not find it
necessary to believe in the historical Jesus and
his resurrection or in the basic historical
accuracy of the gospels’ accounts of this event.
That such persons exist I do not doubt; indeed I

The importance of history to salvation in
the West is well-recognized and if that were all
I were saying, I would indeed be uttering a
commonplace, as Edelman claims. But that is
not all. I am speaking of a primacy given to
historical events themselves that goes beyond
the role of history in other major religious or

have enjoyed meting a few. But strictly
speaking they are not mainstream Christians
and cannot, in good conscience, sign on to any
of the basic creeds and affirmations by which
Christianity, in any recognized denomination,
is defined. An affirmation of precisely this set
of beliefs is, as I point out in Being Different, built

philosophical traditions and that seriously
blocks any genuine pluralism. For Hindus and
Buddhists this point is often difficult to grasp.
The complex relationship between the line of
prophets in the Abrahamic religions -- that is,
between Abraham, Moses, Jesus and
Mohammed, to name only the key ones -- does

into the creed that is the gold standard of
Christian orthodoxy and that is said every
Sunday in every church with a legitimate claim
to Christian identity. Belief in the historical
accuracy of the accounts of Jesus’ rising from
the dead in the gospels was re-emphasized as a
key article of faith even at Vatican II, the
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Church council that supposedly liberalized so
many other Roman Catholic doctrines.
On the matter of Hindu education, the
importance of the study of Sanskrit, and the
full recognition and support of both Western
and Indian scholars who attempt to save and
preserve the textual tradition, I am entirely in
agreement with Edelman, as the record of
projects I have funded through the Infinity
Foundation clearly shows.
Notes
1
See Being Different, pp. 124-126.
A similar point can be made using particulars
and universals instead of parts and wholes.
3
The criteria for being aastika have varied over
time. These include: one who “affirms the value
of ritual” (Medhatithi); one who “affirms the
existence of virtue and vice” (Hariibhadra); one
who “affirms the existence of another world
2

after death” (the grammarians); and one who
“affirms the Vedas as the source of ultimate
truth” (Vijnanabhiksu Madhava, etc.).
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